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Abstrak

Tulisan ini akan mengamlisa kebijakan bantuan Jepang dalam mempromosikan demokrasi
yang mencuat ke tatanan global setelah berakhirnya Perang Dingin. Hal ini penting dan
menarik dikaji mengingat bantuan Jepang selama ini dipahami sangat berorientasi pada
kepentingan ekonomi. Ada tiga pertanyaan utama dalam tulisan ini yaitu, satu, bagaimana
Jepang merespon perkembangan intemasional yang mengaitkan antara bantuan luar negeri
dan
promosi
bagaimana
menformulasikan
Jepang
Kedua,
demokrasi?
kebijakan/pendekatannya dalam mengimplementasikan bantuan demokrasinya dan faktorfaktor apa saja yang mempengaruh pendekatan tersebul. Terakhir, dengan menganalisa
kasus Indonesia, bagaimana tren bantuan Jepang dalam membantu demokratisasi di
Indonesia. Tulisan ini menemukan bahwa Jepang tidak mempunyai pilihan terkecuali
mengikuti perkembangan intemasional, akan tetapi merumuskan program bantuan
demokrasinya secara hati-hati. Bantuan demokrasi Jepang sangat dipengaruhi oleh
pendekatan pembangunan dan menfokuskan program-programnya di level pemerintah.
Kepercayaan bahwa stabilitas ekonomi yang utama perlu dibangun, serta pertimbangan
ekonomi dan politik, mempengaruhi rumusan kebijakan dan pendekatan bantuan demokrasi
ala Jepang.
Kata Kunci: Bantuan ekonomi, Jepang, bantuan demokrasi, pendekatan donor

Introduction

Since 1990s, the United States has raised the “enlargement of the democratic
community” as a key element of U.S foreign policy. As consequences, almost all donor
countries and organizations have focused on democracy and human rights as prerequisites of
assistance and stressing conditionality on political and administrative reform in the recipient
countries. Democracy, human rights and good governance became objectives of aid
conditionality of donor countries and democracy assistance became a substantial element of
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development cooperation (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000:5) and a tool of international

community’s role playing in democratization process in a country.
Previously, World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) was introduced other

forms of conditionality which called Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) with market
liberalization as the primary objective. The main distinction between two is that SAPs aimed
in reforming recipient countries’s economic policy, while the aid conditionality in 1990s
aimed at political reform involving both systemic and substantive aspects (Stokke, 1995:1).
SAPs were initially implemented by Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) program of World

Bank in 1979. The emergence of SAL has caused by the rapid deterioration of economic
conditions in the developing countries during the late of 1970s and early 1980s.
Japan, since 1986, has helped the World Bank SAPs programs by starting structural
adjustment loans (SALs) to many countries, and has become the World Bank’s largest partner
in this area. In contrast, Japan appeared not willing to operate political aid conditionality for

Japanese assistance as other donor countries do. As Japanese Foreign Ministry explained
“Japan has a principle refrained from attaching political conditions to its aid.” (Akaha,
2002:89). However, under international pressure, Japan announced Official Development

Assistance (ODA) Charter 1992 by introducing “Four Guidelines of ODA” which clearly
emphasizes democratization as one of main pillars of Japan’s aid policy (Japan ODA Annual

Report, 1993) and supported the Partnership for Democratic Development (PPD) Initiative at

the Lyon Summit in June 1996. PPD is an initiative that explicitly designed to support
democratization efforts in the developing world. After that, Japan started to support some
activities to promote democracy such as system building in the legal system in Vietnam,
electoral support, and women in a development program (JICA). In case of Indonesia, Japan,

after Soeharto stepped down, has started to distribute their aid for election and other activities
to support democratization in Indonesia, an area which was obviously

a political and for long

time having been avoided by Japan. Since Japan has a principle to avoid political interfere,

these trends are interesting to be explored.
Considering these facts, this paper will investigate the implementation of the Japan’s

democracy aid by addressing three questions. First, how Japan has responded the

international trends on the issue of aid and democracy promotion? Second, how Japan’s
democracy aid approach has been formulated and what are the factors has affected it. Third,

using the Indonesia’s case, how Japan’s democracy aid has been distributed to Indonesia and

how does the trends of Japan’s aid to support democratization in Indonesia?
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This paper will be divided into three sections. Section one will explore the framework

of Japanese democracy aid policy which initially by explaining some definition of democracy
assistances. Section two will investigate the implementation of Japan’s democracy aid to

Indonesia. Final part contains conclusions which reached in this study.
Democracy Assistance: Definitions, Approaches and Types
Definitions

The concept of democracy assistance has been understood in various ways. Some
scholars generalize democracy assistance as foreign aid or part, and others put democracy

assistance as a specific concept arguing that there are different strategies and approaches in
the implementation of democracy assistance and others foreign aid. Foreign aid is defined as
transfer capital, commodities and expert from developed countries to developing and late

developing countries which can be distributed through bilateral and multilateral organizations.
The phase of foreign aid can be divided into two period: first, during the Cold War (1950s-

1990) and second, after the end of Cold war.

In the first period, the conflict between the US and Soviet has colored the motives of
foreign aid at that time. Political and national security could be seen as the main motives of

donor countries in the early of this era. Then, after the end of Cold war that the US has
become a hegemonic power, democratization, human rights and environmental consideration
became important issues for distributing donor’s aid.

Actually, using foreign aid for political development goals has been avoided by donor

for many years because it would be seen as a part of intervention. However, since 1990s, this
goal explicitly formulated with argument that “a democratic form of government and good

governance promote economic development, and that respect for human rights is an
integrated part of poverty orientation.” (Degnbol et.all, 2003:30). As impact, since that time,

political aid conditionality, democracy promotion and democracy assistance, has emerged in

the work of international development. For example, the World Bank formulates good

governance as a development goal and the US emphasized democratic government as a part
of major goal of the US aid.
However, Bearce and Tirone (2010: 840) noted that each donor has their own
strategic goal, for example, “the US aid have been driven by the goal of developing military

relationship, while British and French aid has been directed towards maintaining political
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influence vis-a-vis former colonies

Japanese and German aid has been motivated by the

goal of increasing their economic and commercial power.” The philosophy or framework of
aid of each donor country which then translated into distribution of aid can be used as an

indicator of each donor’s goal. For example, Japan’s developmental aid has been formulated
as keizai kyoryoku, means, economic cooperation. Consequently, economic intentions can be
seen as the core of Japan’s aid.

Related to the relations between aid and democracy, Knack (2004) found that ”no
evidence is found that aid promotes democracy.” Furthermore, he argues that improving
education and increasing per capita incomes are more conducive to democratization rather

than through technical assistance (for election, strengthening legislature and judiciaries, etc.)

and aid conditionality.
Although some scholars found the negative or insignificant relations between aid and
democracy, in fact democracy assistances are still distributed by donors with various
strategies and approaches. Burnell (2000:5) in his work emphasized three conditions which

should be considered before democracy assistance is defined. “First, democratic advance
must be a primary objective of democracy assistance. Second, the methods of democracy

assistance must be peaceful. Third, democracy assistance is negotiated on a not-for-profit

basis (a commercial market transaction). Consequently, democracy assistance should be
funded on a grant basis.” In addition, Schoofs and Zeeuw (2007) stressed that there are two
main ‘entry points’ for external actors to promote democracy: one is to focus on the state; the

other is to focus on civil society. When the international community is serious in helping
countries to become more democratic, both entry points should be

used.2

There are various definitions on democracy assistance. Carothers and Ottaway
(2000:5-6), define democracy assistance is “aid programs specifically designed either to help
non democratic

countries become democratic or to help countries that have initiated

democratic transition consolidate their democratic system.” In parallel, Japan International

Cooperation Agency (JICA) has defined democracy assistance as the support (as funds or

technical assistance) for efforts which have the intention of bringing democratic structure to
the developing world (JICA Study Report, 2003).

As a result, this study defines democracy assistance as an aid program provided by

international community through bilateral or multilateral organizations, to assist non
democratic countries become democratic countries (and to strengthen it), by using peaceful
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This paper will be divided into three sections. Section one will explore the framework

of Japanese democracy aid policy which initially by explaining some definition of democracy
assistances. Section two will investigate the implementation of Japan’s democracy aid to

Indonesia. Final part contains conclusions which reached in this study.
Democracy Assistance: Definitions, Approaches and Types
Definitions

The concept of democracy assistance has been understood in various ways. Some
scholars generalize democracy assistance as foreign aid or part, and others put democracy

assistance as a specific concept arguing that there are different strategies and approaches in
the implementation of democracy assistance and others foreign aid. Foreign aid is defined as
transfer capital, commodities and expert from developed countries to developing and late

developing countries which can be distributed through bilateral and multilateral organizations.
The phase of foreign aid can be divided into two period: first, during the Cold War (1950s-

1990) and second, after the end of Cold war.

In the first period, the conflict between the US and Soviet has colored the motives of
foreign aid at that time. Political and national security could be seen as the main motives of

donor countries in the early of this era. Then, after the end of Cold war that the US has
become a hegemonic power, democratization, human rights and environmental consideration
became important issues for distributing donor’s aid.

Actually, using foreign aid for political development goals has been avoided by donor

for many years because it would be seen as a part of intervention. However, since 1990s, this
goal explicitly formulated with argument that “a democratic form of government and good

governance promote economic development, and that respect for human rights is an
integrated part of poverty orientation.” (Degnbol et.all, 2003:30). As impact, since that time,

political aid conditionality, democracy promotion and democracy assistance, has emerged in

the work of international development. For example, the World Bank formulates good

governance as a development goal and the US emphasized democratic government as a part
of major goal of the US aid.
However, Bearce and Tirone (2010: 840) noted that each donor has their own
strategic goal, for example, “the US aid have been driven by the goal of developing military

relationship, while British and French aid has been directed towards maintaining political
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direct or indirect method, channelled through both government and community level, and be

based on non profit oriented (grant basis) and the country needs.

Regarding the areas of democracy assistance, electoral support (democratic elections)
is recognized as one of the oldest and most widely accepted forms of democracy assistance.

In both political and financial terms, support for elections has probably been the most
prominent sector for democracy assistance, human rights came secondly and, significantly,
less attention was given to the media sectors.3

In case of Indonesia, in the early of political reform, democracy assistance has also
been directed towards democratic elections. This can be understood because in the Soeharto
era, the election was a tool for him to legitimize his power. Therefore, after his fall, there was

a great support from donor countries for the 1999 transitional election. Almost sixty million
dollars fund has been provided by donor countries including Japan, the US and the EU, to

support the first Indonesia democratic election in reform period.
However, the focus of donor democracy aid to elections has been criticized by many

scholars. They argue that it had better and more valuable for donor countries to support long
term projects for democratization. Carothers recognizes that “any effort to strengthen
democracy must necessarily be long term, if the intention is to produce discernible results.”

For example, there have been a variety of programs that have had a direct and indirect impact

on the development of democracy in Southeast Asia. However, the distribution of aid for
development of democracy is less than economic and military assistance He pointed out
“whether an emphasis on political development should have preceded the emphasis on

economic development. The question is important in deciding where best to focus the donors'
resources.”

The Approaches and Types of Democracy Assistance

Carothers (2009) has divided the approach of democracy aid providers into two
categories namely; political approach and developmental approach. He notes that the both

approaches are resulted by the process of differentiation of the strategic of democracy aid
providers. He argues that the US democracy aid as part of political approach, while the EU’s
democracy aid as part of developmental approach. He makes the comparison between the
two approaches by using several dimensions as following:
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Table 1. The Political Approach and Developmental Approach of Democracy

Aid
Political Approach

Developmental Approach

Believe that the advance of
democracy in a country will
contribute to social and economic
development (the socio economic
aspect is secondary)

Believe in supporting democracy based on the
conviction that basic feature of democratic
governance- transparency, accountability, and
responsiveness- contributes to more equitable

Dimension

Value
democracy

of

socioeconomic development.
This approach values democracy as contributing
factor in the larger process of national development.

Concept
democracy

of

Looks beyond an exclusively political definition of
democracy to broader conception that incorporates
and tends to see
socioeconomic concerns
to ensure that citizens can participate economic and social rights as being no less

genuine,
of
importance
The
competitive elections and sufficient
respect for political and civil rights
meaningfully in democratic political

important than political and civil rights.

process.
of
Concept
Democratization

Democratization as a process of
political struggle in which political
actors who can be clearly identified
as democrats contend with non
democratic forces.

This approach conceives of democratization as a
slow, iterative process, measured in decades and
marked by the gradual accumulation of small gains.
They holds that it is better to achieve a certain basic
level of social and economic development, including
an effective state and the rule of law before
proceeding with democratization

of

Directly through assistance (training,
advice, moral, support or funding) to
the political actors themselves.

This approach always stresses the importance of
partnership with host government and
inclines
toward indirect methods of assisting democracy.

Method
supporting
democracy

Indirectly through support to key
institutions- an independent media,
an independent judiciary, etcSource: Carothers, (2009: 6-9), table created by Author

In addition, Sugiura who wrote about “Japanese Foreign

Diplomacy on

Democratization” divided the approaches of international democracy assistance into three
categories as following: coercion, persuasion, and consensus (Sugiura, 2006: 25-27).

Coercion is the approach of donor countries in demanding political reform in recipient

country through aid conditionality, sometimes by suspending aid, economic sanctions or
diplomatic sanctions. Furthermore, donor countries sometimes implemented the military

action and have also strongly supported the pro-democracy groups to support democratic
movement in recipient country. In other hand, donor approach which is based on partnership
with the government of recipient countries and focusing on the request from the government
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could be categorized as persuasion and consensus approaches. In these approaches, donors
which
scheme
development
economic
under
cooperate
to
have
governments
host
and
believed has indirectly affected the process of democratization. He argued that the Japanese
approach to promote democracy is based on persuasion and consensus (Sugiura, 2006: 40).

Other scholars, Stephen J. Golub in his work “Democracy and Development”, by
using the US aid for democracy and governance as the case study, divides democracy aid into
two types (Golub, 2000:136-137); democracy with Big D and democracy with small d (the D
or d means democracy). The assistance which is directed at formal systems of governance

such as elections, judiciaries, legislatures, political parties, and other core democratic
institutions, could be categorized as democracy with a “Big D”. In contrast, assistance which
is distributed with a focus on democracy with a “small d” aims in part at socioeconomic
progress for disadvantaged people, aspiring to have an impact on specific policies, practices,

and populations. The disadvantaged people here are defined by Golub as citizen who
participates little in governance and benefit little from development. He considered the
importance of the role of civil society organizations whose primary focus is socioeconomic
development to achieve both development and democratization. Therefore, he argues
democracy aid should support “small d” over “Big D” initiatives.

Table 2. The Distinction between Big D and small d
Big D

small d

Core Activities

Political
Democratic
institutions
system/Democratic
elections,
as
reform
such
judiciaries, legislature, etc.

Socioeconomic Development, for
example, civic education and
advocacy

Aims

Progress on democracy and the rule
of law on the national level

Aiming at having impact on
specific policies, practices and
populations, especially to achieve
for
socio economic progress
disadvantaged people

Focus of entry point

State level

Community level

Method of assisting democracy

Direct

Indirect

Dimension

Source: Golub (2000: 136-138), table created by Author

Therefore, related to research questions and the explanations of democracy assistance,

the study offers two hypotheses. First, Japan has given a positive response towards the idea
44
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of democratic community enlargement (democracy promotion), but limit themselves to
engage in democracy promotion activities. Second, the economic interest and the belief that
prioritizing economic development was necessary to achieve democratic development have

influenced the pattern of Japanese democracy aid policies. Third, the pattern of Japanese

democracy assistance in Indonesia is focused on the Big D, and affected by the
developmental approach. As the largest investor in Indonesia, Japan has been implemented

this approach to keep and maintain a good relationship with Indonesian government which is
directly or indirectly expected to secure Japan’s interest in Indonesia.

The Framework of Japan’s Development Aid for Promoting Democracy

In contrast to the US policies on “enlargement of the democratic community”, Japan
appeared unwilling to make political aid a condition for its assistance as other donor countries
do. The Japanese Foreign Ministry explained, “Japan has a principle of refraining from
attaching political conditions to its aid” (Akaha, 2002:98). However, after the end of Cold
War, almost all of Development Assistance Countries (DAC) members have put democracy

and good governance as a basis of legitimacy of rendering their assistance.

As a consequence, in 1991, Japanese government changed its aid policy by

introducing “Four Guidelines of Official Development Assistance (ODA).” At this time,

Japan announced the ODA Charter 1992, which clearly emphasizes democratization as one of
main pillars of Japan's aid policy (Japan ODA Annual Report, 1993). The Japanese
government also supported the Partnership for Democratic Development (PDD) Initiative at

the Lyon Summit in June 1996. PDD is an initiative explicitly designed to support

democratization efforts in the developing world. PDD assistance is intended to help recipient

countries develop legal, administrative, electoral and police systems and institutions, as well
as to build the human resources capacity necessary for democratization and human rights

protection.4
Furthermore, since mid 1990s, the Japanese Government made a study group to

formulate how Japan can contribute in promoting democracy. This group composed of

researchers/academician from the university and element from Government such as the
person from Ministry of foreign affairs and the Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA). As result was the involvement of good governance and decentralization issues as a
way to promote democracy which focused on the long-term approach (JICA Study Report:
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1995, 155). Since that time, Japan started to support system building in the legal system in
Vietnam, strengthening civil society by focusing on electoral support in Zambia, Cambodia

and other countries, and human rights including women in development program.
the widespread of democratization movement in the early 2000s,
JICA organized a study group which expected to formulate the proposal for democracy
assistance of Japanese ODA. The study group began their work by examining three main
Considering

elements of democratization; democratic political system, institutions which make democracy
work (governance), and an effective socioeconomic foundation for democracy. This group

concluded that Japan can play a role by focusing their assistance on the governance and the
socio economic foundation (JICA Study Report, 2003:12 and 24).
Meanwhile, the Japanese democracy aid has been continually debated by many

scholars. As Juichi Inada (Inada, 2005:14) says, “Japan has tended to disconnect the three

factors of development, democracy and security (con diet)-which are closely linked to one

another in fact.” Moreover he also argues Japan’s ODA still clearly prioritizes development
and the Japanese government justifies this policy by emphasizing the positive impact of
development on the other two factors, security and democracy.
In addition, Kazuo Inoue, a former of House of Representatives Members, said that

the limitations of Japanese approach to promote democracy could be explained by two

reasons ( Jakarta Post, Oct. 19, 2004).5 First is civil society and the non-governmental sector

are not as strong in Japan as other countries such as the US. Second is the initiatives to
organize a democracy assistance organization are not supported by the bureaucracy. Since the

Japanese government has a principle do not interfere the political affairs of other countries,
the kind of organization which having a political intention has a difficult to be constructed.

Some scholars also argue that the long history of the US NGOs, the Western religious
prescription for charity and the Japanese belief in the overarching role of government

affected the gap between the US and Japanese

NGOs.6 Moreover, the

relationship between

NGOs and government in Japan and the US is quite different. The US government belief that

the NGOs activities support a principle objective of the US foreign policy, and therefore the
US government recognized the importance of NGOs in the policymaking and implementation
process. While in Japan, the NGOs have faced the lack of government support towards their

activities.7
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However, in the 1990s, the Japanese government came to realize the importance of

Japanese NGOs as a partner. Then, the government has formulated some schemes in the areas

of social and welfare such as health, education, and environment to build cooperation with
Japanese NGOs. In the other hand, although there was some a positive progress towards the

relationship between government and NGOs, the data shown the small components of NGOs
in Japanese aid which only 3% of aid budget in 2008. A small distribution to NGOs has been

identifying that “Japan tends not to make use of either Japanese or local NGOs as

implementing partners” (DAC Peer Review of OECD 2010, p. 17).
Based on DAC Report, if we compare the amount of aid in the area of government
and civil society (GSC) between Japan, the US and the EU, Japan’s aid was far less than the

US and EU’s aid distribution. In 2006, the trend of Japanese aid has increased about 150%,

but the amount has still far less than the two countries. Moreover, if we look to the

percentage of total aid, Japan’s GSC aid placed only about 1-2 percentage of total aid every

year, except in the 2002. In the other hand, the US and the EU has more attention towards

GSC program than Japan which is indicated by the percentage of their GSC aid as described
in the table below.

In addition, the U.S. NGO "Democracy Coalition Project" (Democracy Coalition
Project, the following abbreviated as DCP) explained three factors which influenced Japan4 s
limited approach to democracy promotion. First, based on Japanese experience before 8

Table 3. GSC Aid from Japan, the US and the EU 2000-2009
(in millions US$)

Year

JPN
% of Total
GSC Aid
Aid

US
% of Total

GSC Aid

2000

176.91

1.2

620.98

2001
2002

60.77
375.82

2003
2004

260.43
276.28

1,283.26
1,085.45
2,918.78

2005
2006

102.73
378.16
290.5
277.33
342.92
2,541.85

0.5
4
1.7
2.1
0.58
2.7

2007

2008
2009

2.2

1.5
2.2

EU

5,032.49
4,625.24
2,705.74
4,604.87
4,864.50
5,530.56

Aid
6.1

GSC Aid

% of Total Aid

645.22

8.9

13.3
8.9

390.43
847.25
971.07

6.9

2,937.68

22

3,214.92
2,479.56

16
19
18
12
13

13
21
16
11
18
15
18

Total
33,271.87
Source: http: '/slats, need,ore/tndex.aspx? DatasetCode=ODA SECTOR
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2,483.51
2,691.79

2,099.10
18,760.53

14

11
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World War II, when the global economic depression in the late of 1920’s, emerging
democracy in Japan gave a way to the rise of non democratic government, Japan has a firm

belief that economic development should become the priorities in order to build a strong
social foundation for democracy. Second, The Japanese “economic miracle” in 1970s- 1980s
under strong and centralized leadership became a role model of other countries to develop

their countries. These kinds of countries sometimes have been ruled under authoritarian way.
Since at that time the world has faced threat of communism, Japan tolerated and even
supported authoritarian regime who sought to achieve economic and social stability. Third,

social or political region instability that might be occurred during democratization which
would not create a situation conducive to Japan’s national economic and security interests has

influenced the passivity of Japan’s support for democratization.
Furthermore, Akaha identified an important reason to understand the passive of

Japanese political aid. The reason is that its foreign policy has long been geared toward
promoting economic and commercial interest, and its foreign aid policy has been a means of
achieving this goal (Akaha, 2002:89-92). In addition, in line with the idea of Japanese foreign
aid as keizai kyooryoku (economic cooperation) and the slogan seikei bunri, which means

“the separation of the economic from the political”, the Japanese government tends to avoid

the political area for their aid implementation (Clear, 2002:137).
From those perspectives above, this study pointed out that Japanese democracy aid

has not been formulated enthusiastically. The Japanese democracy aid has been limited by
two main factors, the belief that economic stability should be developed first and the

principle to avoid interfere the political affairs of recipient countries or non-intervention

principle.9
Japan’s Aid to Indonesia from Soeharto to the Reform Period: From Development to

Democracy Assistance

The introduction of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter 1992 and the

Initiative of PPD in 1996 represented the change in Japanese aid policy. However, even after
adopting the ODA Charter and PPD, the aim of Japanese assistance to support
democratization and human rights in Indonesia has not realized in the method of distribution

of Japan’s ODA. The distributions of Japanese aid to Indonesia were still focused on the

infrastructure and manufacture sectors and dominated by loans (ODA White Paper, 2007).
48
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Considering the political aid programs are often formulated under grants and technical
cooperation, dominance of yen loans in Japan's aid policy which focused on infrastructure
development became one of the signs of the lack of attention to the political development in

Indonesia.
However, due to the economic crisis in 1997, the political situation in Indonesia went

from bad to worse that marked by a clash between students and security forces on May 12,

1998, which put a great pressure, both domestic and international on Soeharto to leave office.
The Japanese government showed concern about the political chaos in Indonesia, but it

refrained from taking strict measures. Although some Japanese NGOs demanded the

Japanese government suspend aid to Indonesia, they were ignored, and the government

continued providing aid to Indonesia (Furuoka, 2007: 14).
The fall of Soeharto, paralleled with instability of economic and political situation, had

given a chance for international community playing a role to facilitate political reform in
Indonesia. Japanese government itself had tried to help Indonesia by giving aid package

bilaterally and multilaterally in order to keep and maintain Soeharto’s regime. As a large
investor to Indonesia, Japan was enjoyed the stability of Indonesia under Soeharto

dictatorship. Therefore, the Japanese government seemed to believe or to hope that Soeharto

could overcome current problems and maintain his power (Furuoka, 2006:187). Moreover,
the former Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia, Kimio Fujita said that the policy of Soeharto
which emphasized on development was compatible with the way of Japanese thought on
development (Asahi Shimbun, June 2nd, 1999).

However, after Soeharto stepped down, the new government was under pressure to

carry out democratic reform. A transitional election was soon organized, and consequently,
the Japanese government has no choice but to support democratic reform and started to
allocate their aid to support the transitional election in Indonesia. Japan announced its

commitment to provide technical and financial assistance on March 16, 1999.10 It was the

first time Japanese aid to Indonesia had been used directly for political activities. Since the
support had been channeled through UNDP, it meant Japan kept away from the political

nature of aid and avoiding the possible negative effect in its bilateral relations with Indonesia

(Clear, 2002: 116).
The decision to support the general election in 1999 seemed a belated response while

others countries signed a memorandum for Indonesian electoral assistance through UNDP
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right away. The JICA officials explained that since supporting election was a first time for
Japan to be involved in Indonesian political activities, the belated response of the Japanese
government should be understandable. The Japanese government first had to design what

kind of aid scheme could be used and what activity could be proposed to support the

Indonesian political reform process {Interview with JICA Southeast Asia Division, June 1 1,
2003). From their statement, it can be summarized that Japan had never arranged and

designed their aid to be involved in supporting political reform in Indonesia.

Following the implementation of Japanese democracy aid to Indonesia, the study

found the limited programs directly connected to democracy and governance areas funded by
Japanese aid. The election assistance package received the greatest funding. In the 1999

election, most of the Japanese fund (US$30, 97 million) channelled through UNDP, has
distributed to cover the technical and material needs such as voter registration, press center,
electoral ink, ballot printing, etc. The remaining funds about US$3, 49 million was intended

to be used for monitoring and voter education by Indonesian NGOs, and for other purposes

such as sending international observer, and dispatch of experts to the central and local
General Election Commissions {Komisi Panitia PemilufKPU) for technical advice in the field
of training and IT technical support.

In the 2004 Legislative and Presidential election, however, Japan did not channel their
funds to UNDP again. The Japanese fund has been channelled under bilateral cooperation

scheme. Considering the change of Japanese method to distribute their fund, it could be
indicated as a way of the Japanese government to look more active and serious in supporting

democratic process in Indonesia. Besides providing the financial assistance which distributed
to KPU for the procurement of electoral equipment (bullet boxes and pooling booths),
Japanese fund also designated to support the voter education program which conducted by

Indonesian NGOs. By coordinating with Indonesian government, there were some Indonesian
NGOs (Pemuda Muhammadiyah, LP3ES, Parwi Foundation and LSI, JAMPPI) has been
selected to conduct that program in Java, Sulawesi, Sumatera, and West Nusa Tenggara.’1
The program was aimed at disseminating information on the new election system, and voting
system through distributing PR materials, organizing seminars, and through talk show in

radio. For the 2009 election, Japan’s also distributed their aid for NGOs, however, the
amount was still less than aid which has channelled to government. The involvement of
NGOs in Japanese aid could be seen as a positive response toward some criticism on the low
of NGOs element in Japanese aid. However, considering the most of funds has still
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distributed for logistics/material supply, the way of Japanese democracy aid, especially for

electoral assistance, has not changed substantially.
Table 4. Japan’s electoral Assistance to Indonesia
Contents of Assistance

Year of
Election

1998

Financial assistance to cover technical and
material support such as ballot printing (400
million pieces), electoral ink (600 bottles),
guideline book for (2,8 million books), Radio
Single Side Band (1,000 sets) and others
materials for vote tabulation.

Amount

Total Amount/scheme

$30,970,000

$34,450,000/

Emergency Assistance

3,480,000,

Financial assistance for voter education and
election monitoring
2004

Financial assistance for bullet boxes (623
boxes) and pooling booths (1 12 million sets)

Financial assistance for domestic and
international NGOs; and Voter Education
2009

Financial assistance for socialization through
Government of Indonesia (Ministry of Home

$22,000,000

Governance Aid
$270,000

$3,338,190

$3,466,068/
Governance Aid

Affairs)

Financial assistance for domestic and
international NGOs; and Voter Education

$22,270,000/

$127,878

UNDP
(http.7/www.undp.or.id/press/view.asp?FileII>=1 9990604- l&lang=id)
Source:
http://www.mofa.go.jp/Mofaj/area/indonesia/04/shien.html)

and

In addition, although during the latter half of the 1990s, JICA began to strengthen its
cooperation with NGOs, however, the element of NGOs both Japanese and local, are still

limited in Japanese aid compared to other donor countries. For Japanese NGOs, most of them

have activities which have not connected directly toward democracy in Indonesia.
Considering this fact, this study argues that concentrating the analysis on direct assistance for

democracy by government it may be possible that we can figure out the policy orientation of

Japanese government by restricting the analysis on its direct involvement in assistance. If a

certain policy were regarded important, the government would directly engage themselves in
it, given that the Japanese government has been characterized as 'Statist'.

The other Japanese democracy and governance programs were focused on projects to
reform Indonesia's National Police by promoting Indonesia's civilian police force activities.

Under the scheme of Support Program for Reform of Indonesian national police, this project
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is aimed to socialize a model police station, and designated the police station in Bekasi, West
Java. Moreover, in order to promote citizen trust in the civilian police force, this project also

established a citizen-police partnership center, which is used as a base for citizen police force
activities at a local level.
This project shown the centre of program was the technical cooperation project
which focused on the state level. In similar, another program such as judicial and bureaucracy

reform were conducted on the state level rather than collaborating with civil society or
NGOs. Japan's support for democratization in Indonesia, can be summarized as the table 5
below.

Table 5. the Japanese Aid for Democracy and Governance Programs to Indonesia
1999-2007
No.
1.

Name of Projects

Electoral assistance
Emergency Assistance for Democratization (The
1999 Transitional Election)
Support for administrative reform and the 2004
election support package
Support for local elections in Aceh (in the
framework of human security project in the
grassroots level)
Support for the 2009 General election

Years

Amount

1999

30,97

2004

22,27

2006

0,014

2009

3,46
(In US$ Million)

2.

3.

Police reform assistance
Capacity-building project of police activities
The project capacity building activities in Bali
police
Indonesian police capacity-building projects
Citizen Police promotion of partnership projects
Regional
Development
and
Decentralization
Development of local human resource
Research projects for the removal of the central
government of Indonesia
Support for Decentralization (Nusa Tenggara
Barat and Sulawesi)
Good Governance
Emergency assistance for administrative reform
Technical cooperation to eradicate corruption
committee

512

2002-2007
2007-2012

(in million yen)

2001-2007

Na

2001

Na

2005

0,034
(In US$ Million)

_

4.

Women Empowerment
5.
2001-2003
Na
Na: Not Available
Source: JICA Report (2002, 98-107) and Japan’s ODA Annual Report (2000-2007), compiled by Author
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In summary, based on some approaches of democracy assistance which explained in
part 2, this study argues that although Japanese aid policy had placed the program for creating

a democratic and fair society as one of pillars (Japan Country Assistance Program for
Indonesia, 2004), in fact, Japan was still prioritized non political area in distributing their aid.

It seems that the policy did not identifying specific area for democratization, but it defined
broadly which was rooted on the developmental approach. Moreover, Japan had a firm belief
that democracy could not be secured without economic development and social stability.
Therefore they have pursued policies and program designed to help strengthen national
economies over support for democracy directly. The Japanese efforts to avoid getting

involved directly in political area as much as possible could also be identified that Japanese
democracy promotion formulated carefully. The Japanese government worried that working

in the democracy area might be interpreted as intervention. The approach of Japan’s
democracy aid can be described at chart below.

Chart 1. Japan’s Democracy Assistance Approach to Indonesia

Big D
i k

2
JAPAN

Developmental

Political

Approach

Approach

(Tends to use persuasive/consensus approach

(Tends to use coercive approach)

small d

Conclusions

Looking at the framework and the implementation of Japan’s democracy aid to
Indonesia, we can summarize that Japan has no choice except following the international
trend which linking foreign aid and democracy. Japan’s democracy aid seems to be

democracy with a ‘‘Big D” which influenced by developmental approach. The Japanese
government formulated their democracy assistance broadly. It could be said that the Japanese

aid has unenthusiastic to get involved in the political arena directly. Moreover, by focusing
GLOBAL Voi. 13 No. 1 Mei 2011
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aid program at the government level, the Japanese aid has been working more on Big D area.

Japan looks strictly limited their approach on developmental approach. The economic and
political reasons as explained above has affected the way of Japanese democracy aid.
In addition, the weakness of civil society and non-governmental sectors has been

influenced the passivity of Japanese democracy aid. Moreover, considering the Japan’s belief
that economic development is an indispensable precondition for democratic development, it
could become a clear point how Japanese aid policy has been designed to involve in

democracy promotion. Therefore, the first involvement of Japanese aid to support the 1999
Indonesia transitional election could be understood as the result of outside pressure, rather

than their own willingness. Moreover, a small amount of Japanese democracy aid to civil
society in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections could be indicated as a less attention of Japanese
government to support civil society activities. However, considering the importance of civil

society to build and maintain democratic election as a basis of democracy in Indonesia, civil
society aid should become the priorities area of Japanese aid too. By supporting both levels,

we can hope the sustainability of democracy in Indonesia.
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